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i Abstract 
The New Zealand government introduced a Primary Health Care Strategy 
(PHCS) in 2001 aimed at improving access to primary health care, improving health, and 
reducing inequalities in health. The Strategy represented a substantive increase in health 
funding by government and a move from a targeted to a universal funding model. This paper 
uses representative national survey data to examine the distribution of fees paid for primary 
health care by different individuals under the mixed public-private financing model in place 
prior to the introduction of PHCS. Using multivariate regression analysis, we find that fees 
do vary, with people who might be expected to have greater needs paying less. However, 
apart from people with diabetes, there is no direct link between self-reported health status 
and fees paid. The findings indicate that a mixed public-private financing model can result in 
a fee structure which recognises differences across different population groups. The findings 
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iv 1 Introduction 
The impact of patient co-payments on access to care, utilisation of services and 
health outcomes, and the implications for public policy of patient co-payments, have been 
the focus of much attention in the international health policy literature over many years 
(Scitovsky and Sneider, 1972; Rice and Morrison, 1994; Sepehri and Chernomas, 2001). The 
issue is of particular salience in New Zealand, where primary health care traditionally has 
been only partially subsidised by government, resulting in individual New Zealanders co-
funding their access to primary health care through significant out-of-pocket payments, with 
the level of co-payments traditionally set by general practitioners (GPs), in an unregulated 
market setting.  
Concerns have long been expressed that these arrangements have resulted in 
significant barriers to access to primary health care for many New Zealanders, particularly 
amongst Māori, Pacific, low income and high needs populations (Crengle, 1999; Cumming 
and Mays, 1999; Ministry of Health, 1999; Tukiotonga, 1999; Raymont, 2004). Such barriers 
to access are likely to have resulted in poorer health status and higher than appropriate use of 
secondary care services for those affected. As a result, the New Zealand government 
introduced in 2001 a Primary Health Care Strategy (PHCS) aimed at improving access to 
primary health care, improving health, and reducing inequalities in health. The PHCS 
represents a move from targeted to universal funding of primary health care. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the distribution of fees paid for primary 
health care by different individuals prior to the introduction of PHCS. It uses data from two 
national health surveys – the 1996/97 and 2002/03 New Zealand Health Surveys – to 
explore the levels of fees paid by patients using primary health care services in these two 
years, to analyse the determinants of differing fee levels across a range of economic, socio-
demographic and health characteristics, and to consider the financial implications arising 
from the use of a mixed public-private financing model. This model allows us to examine the 
extent that New Zealanders with different health needs are paying different prices in the 
unregulated markets for GP services.  
We begin by describing the current institutional environment in New Zealand 
and how it changed with the introduction of the PHCS. We then compare the financing 
model used in New Zealand to those used in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom 
and Australia and discuss previous research on primary health care fees in these countries. 
We next describe the data used in this study and discuss the difference in fees paid by 
different individuals in each of the two years, using bivariate analysis. In order to assess these 
differences more thoroughly, we then derive a multivariate model for variation in fees paid 
1 and use the data to estimate the relationship between various socio-economic and health 
characteristics and the GP fees paid by individuals. The results are then presented and 
discussed. 
2 Background 
The New Zealand government originally introduced policies to finance primary 
health care for the population in the mid-1930s. Initially, it was hoped to introduce free 
primary health care for all New Zealanders, with providers to be funded on a capitation 
basis. However, protracted negotiations with the British Medical Association (which 
represented New Zealand GPs at that time) resulted instead in the introduction of 
government fee-for-service partial subsidies for GP care, with GPs retaining the right to 
charge patients fees directly (except for maternity care). The government paid GPs directly 
on a claims basis, and the subsidies originally covered about 66 percent of the total fee 
charged by GPs for their services (Government White Paper, 1974).  
By the 1970s, however, the government subsidy represented only around 33 
percent of the fees GPs charged, and concerns were being raised about the impact of these 
charges on New Zealanders’ access to services, particularly for those with poorer health, for 
those who use services regularly and for those on lower incomes (Government White Paper, 
1974). In the early 1990s, the funding arrangements were altered, with government subsidies 
increased but targeted through the use of entitlement cards. The Community Services Card 
(CSC) was made available for household on a low income and the High Use Health Card 
(HUHC) was made available for those regularly using primary health care services. Both 
cards represented entitlement to subsidies. About 50 percent of the population were entitled 
to the CSC (Gribben, 1996) and an estimated five percent were eligible for the HUHC. Take-
up for both these cards, however, was thought to be lower than expected (Foley, 
unpublished).  
In 1997, universal subsidies were introduced for children, with the aim of free 
care provision for those aged less than six years of age, although in practice some fees 
continued to be charged by some practices. At this stage, adult New Zealanders without a 
CSC or HUHC were not receiving any government subsidies towards the cost of their 
primary health care (Davis et al, 1994). In 2001, the New Zealand government introduced a 
Primary Health Care Strategy (PHCS) aimed at improving access to primary health care, 
improving health and reducing inequalities in health.  
Implementation has proceeded extremely quickly, with Primary Health 
Organisations (PHOs) developed to put the new policies into practice. By September 2008, 
2 some four million New Zealanders were enrolled with 80 PHOs. Part of the PHCS involves 
moving from a targeted to a universal financing model, so that all New Zealanders are now 
eligible for subsidised primary health care services. The government has committed more 
than $2.2 billion over seven years from 2002/03 for implementation of the Strategy 
(Hodgson, 2006). New funding was provided first to Access PHOs, with high need 
populations, to reduce user charges for all their enrolees. New funding for Interim PHOs 
(with a lower proportion of enrolees with higher needs) was rolled out by age group over the 
past few years, again with much of the new funding aimed at reducing the fees that New 
Zealanders pay when they use services. Additional funding has also been provided to offer 
further financial support to PHOs committed to ensuring very low cost access by 
maintaining low fees (Hodgson, 2007). All PHOs have also received funding for 
management support services, for health promotion and for ‘services to increase access’, and 
PHOs are able also to access Care Plus funding, aimed at improving the care provided to 
individuals with chronic illnesses (Ministry of Health, 2004).  
Beyond the primary health care sector, New Zealand has a universal public health 
insurance scheme. This includes universal accident insurance managed by the Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC). District Health Boards (DHBs) are responsible for 
ensuring the provision of health and disability services in New Zealand. There are 21 DHBs 
located throughout New Zealand. The Ministry of Health is a central government 
organisation which oversees the DHBs, providing them with support, funding, and national 
policy advice (Ministry of Health, 2003). Public hospitals are fully subsidised by the 
government, while dentists and pharmaceuticals are partially subsidised. Private hospitals are 
also available for those who are willing to pay for the immediate treatment of non-urgent 
health problems. In 2005, 78 percent of total health expenditure was funded by the 
government, four percent through private health insurance, and 17 percent through user-
charges (OECD, 2007). 
3 International  Comparisons 
The financing of primary health care differs greatly between countries. In this 
section, we review the financing models used in the United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia and discuss previous research on GP fees in each of these 
countries.1 Compared to these countries, the institutional situation in New Zealand is unique 
in the sense that a universal health care system is in place (and secondary services are free), 
but the market for GP services is essentially unregulated in the price domain. Thus, it is an 
                                                           
1 Unless otherwise stated, the information in section on health systems is taken from OECD (2007) 
and refers to the situation in each country in 2005.  
3 ideal country in which to examine the characteristics correlated with GP fees, as individuals 
have complete freedom to choose different providers but providers are constrained by the 
fact that individuals can use secondary facilities as an alternative provider of services. 
3.1 United  States 
There are two main public insurance programmes in the United States which, in 
total, cover 27 percent of the population. These are Medicare, which provides insurance 
cover for the elderly population and some of those with disabilities, and Medicaid, which 
provides cover for a segment of the poor population. Approximately 59 percent of the 
population have private health insurance. The extent to which this coverage includes 
different health services depends on the specifics of each insurance policy. Private insurance 
makes up 37 percent of total expenditures on health, while public insurance makes up 45 
percent of total health expenditure. User-charges make up 13 percent of health expenditure. 
Hospitals and physicians are paid in a variety of ways, including through charges, capitation 
and discounted fees. 
Steinwald and Stone (1974) is one of the only papers that has investigated 
determinants of GP fees. The authors used data reported by GPs to estimate the importance 
of physician characteristics, practice characteristics, patient characteristics and insurance 
types on the prices charged by GPs. They found that patient characteristics and insurance 
type were more important in explaining variations in fees between GPs than the GP or 
practice characteristics. Fees had a weak but significant positive association with patient 
income. The income effect was twice as strong for the more highly skilled internists as for 
GPs. They also found a positive relationship between the number of physicians in other 
fields relative to the population and a negative relationship between the numbers of 
physicians in the same field relative to the population. 
Other research on this topic in the United States has focused on modelling the 
market for GP services, particularly with regard to determining whether the market is 
perfectly competitive or monopolistic (Newhouse, 1970), determining whether physician 
induced demand maintains GP income levels when fees are fixed (Hadley and Reschovsky, 
2006), and attempting to explain the faster rate of growth in health expenditure in the United 
States relative to other countries (Anderson et al. 2005). Research has also raised concerns 
regarding the health and wellbeing of the 14 percent of the population that is not covered by 
any type of insurance (Ayanian et al, 2000). 
4 3.2 Canada 
Canada has a universal, comprehensive, public health insurance scheme. All 
“medically necessary” care is provided by hospitals and physicians and is fully funded by the 
provinces and the Federal Government (Barer et al 1988). Patients face no user charges for 
these services. Private insurance is available for services not covered by the public insurance 
system, such as dental care, rehabilitation and prescription drugs.  
Public funding comprises about 70 percent of total health expenditure, with 
private insurance making up 12 percent and user charges (for those services not covered by 
the federal/provincial plans) 15 percent. Physicians are mainly paid on a fee-for-service basis, 
with the fees negotiated annually between the provincial medical association and provincial 
ministries. If physicians wish to charge patients fees for services covered by the 
federal/provincial plans, they cannot be included in the public system. Hospitals are mainly 
funded on a budgetary basis. 
Research has shown that the comprehensive, universal insurance system has 
reduced barriers to access for those with low socio-economic status (Beck, 1978; Eyles et al, 
1995). Concerns, however, are still expressed that there are other barriers to health care. 
While Dunlop et al (2000) found that income was not significantly associated with GP visits, 
education was significant, and income was significantly associated with visits to specialists. 
As a referral is required from a GP for a specialist visit this has health implications for those 
on low-incomes. 
3.3 United  Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (UK) has a fairly comprehensive, universal public health 
insurance system with the health care provided by the National Health Service. The public 
insurance covers “medically necessary” health care as well as dental care, rehabilitation and 
some prescription drugs. Twelve percent of the population have private insurance to cover 
private medical care. Public funding comprises of 87 percent of total health expenditure. The 
remaining 13 percent is privately funded through user-charges and private health insurance. 
GPs belong to Primary Care Trusts which receive funding for their enrolees. Hospitals are 
usually also funded through the Primary Care Trusts. 
Dixon et al (2003) reviewed the literature on the equity of the British National 
Health Service (NHS). They discuss research which examines overall health status, as well as 
research which focuses on particular types of health problem, such as cardiac care or 
preventative services. They report that the literature finds a weak link between 
socioeconomic status and overall health status, but that for specific health problems, 
5 individuals with lower socioeconomic status obtain lower levels of health care relative to 
need. The authors conclude that barriers to access to health care exist for those with lower 
socioeconomic status, even though the fee barrier present in some other countries has, in the 
United Kingdom, been removed. They provide evidence to support the following barriers to 
access for those on a low income: longer travel time, greater travel cost, lower car ownership, 
fewer networks within the medical profession, less confidence in communicating with a GP, 
different health beliefs, and lower health literacy skills. 
3.4 Australia 
Australia has a universal public health insurance scheme (Medicare). This 
insurance covers most medical services, although GPs are able to impose user-charges if they 
wish. Total health expenditure consists of 67 percent public funds, 20 percent user charges, 
and seven percent to private insurers. Private insurance is held by 43 percent of the 
population and covers GP user charges and private hospitals. Since 1996 the Australian 
government has encouraged uptake of private insurance through subsidies and tax incentives 
(Van Doorslaer et al, 2008). 
Like New Zealand, there has been a strong research focus on the equity of user 
charges. Jones et al. (2008) investigated healthcare fee payments as a proportion of 
household expenditure for those with concessionary cards (entitlement to government 
subsidies) and those without. They found that those with concessionary cards paid lower GP 
fees than non-card holders. However this was not the case for all areas of healthcare. Other 
research has reviewed the equity of the mixed public-private financing model. Lairson et al 
(1995) found that those on higher incomes were more likely to receive health care from a GP 
or specialist while those on lower incomes were more likely to receive care as a hospital out-
patient. More recently, Van Doorslaer et al (2008) have produced similar finding based on 
comparisons between those who have private health insurance and those who do not. They 
find that access to health care is equitable, however the mix of services received is not. 
Higher income patients are more likely to see a specialist rather than a GP and are more 
likely to be a private patient in a hospital than a public patient. 
4 Data 
This paper analyses data from the New Zealand Health Survey (NZHS), which is 
a national, representative survey of population health. The NZHS collects cross-sectional 
data on the health status of New Zealanders, the prevalence of risk and protective factors 
associated with these health conditions, and the use of health services, including satisfaction 
with health services and barriers to accessing health services. The NZHS was undertaken in 
6 1992/93, 1996/97, and 2002/03. This paper examines data from the 1996/97 and 2002/03 
surveys.
2  
The sample design of the survey differed in each wave. Both waves involved 
face-to-face interviews with New Zealanders aged 15 years and over. The 1996/97 survey 
collected data from 7,862 adults (one per sample dwelling) on their health, as well as on the 
health of at most one eligible child per sample dwelling. Respondents were asked to fill in a 
General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), which included questions on self-reported health 
status, limitations to daily activities and alcohol consumption. They were then interviewed, 
with the interviewer collecting data on chronic disease, health service use, risk and protective 
factors, and socio-demographic characteristics, in that order. The 2002/03 survey collected 
data from 12,529 adults (one per sample dwelling). Unlike the 1996/97 survey, it did not 
collect data on the health of children. All questions were asked in an interview, with data 
collected on chronic disease, health service use, risk and protective factors, self-reported 
health status, and socio-demographic characteristics, in that order.  
This analysis focuses on the adult respondents from both surveys. Data from a 
small number of individuals who reported that they were in the armed forces at the time and 
individuals with missing data on key variables are dropped from all analyses.
3 The resultant 
analysis sample consisted of 7,269 adults from the 1996/97 survey and 12,237 adults from 
the 2002/03 survey. Both surveys were designed as stratified random samples with certain 
ethnic and geographic groups over-sampled to provide more reliable estimates. All results in 
this paper are calculated using the appropriate sample weights, which are designed to 
produce estimates for a representative sample of adult New Zealanders. 
The key variable of interest in this paper is the fees paid by adult New Zealanders 
for primary health care. Individuals in each survey were asked whether they had visited a 
general practitioner (GP) in the last 12 months.
4 If they answered ‘yes’ to this question, they 
were then asked what the doctor charged them for their last visit. Responses to this question 
                                                           
2 Data from 1992/93 were not examined owing to significant differences in the data collected. 
3 For example, for the 1996/97 survey, we drop 213 individuals with missing data on alcohol 
consumption, 138 with missing data on self-reported health status, 108 with missing or incomplete 
data on employment status, 69 with missing data on health insurance, 68 with missing data on asthma, 
and a smaller number of individuals missing data on other questions. For the 2002/03 survey, we drop 
142 individual with missing data on health insurance, 45 with missing data on high blood pressure, 23 
with missing or incomplete data on employment status, and a smaller number of individuals missing 
data on other questions.  
4 In the 1996/97 survey this question reads, “In the last 12 months, have you seen a doctor or been 
visited by a doctor about your own health? By ‘doctor’ I mean any GP or family doctor, but not a 
specialist.” In the 2002/03 survey this question reads, “In the last 12 months, have you seen a doctor, 
or been visited by a doctor, about your own health? By health, we include your mental and emotional 
health as well as your physical health.”  
7 are coded in $10 ranges (e.g. $10 or less, $11-20, and so forth), with top-coding at ‘more than 
$40’ in the 1996/97 survey and at ‘more than $50’ in the 2002/03 survey. Other valid 
responses include, ‘free’, ‘other arrangements’, or ‘don’t know’.
5  
Table 1 examines primary health care utilisation and fees paid by age-group for 
respondents in each survey.
6 In 1996/97, 79 percent of New Zealanders visited a GP in the 
last year. Of these, 12 percent paid nothing for their visit, 41 percent paid $20 or less, 43 
percent paid $21-40, and four percent paid more than $40. Primary health care utilisation was 
at similar levels in 2002/03, with 81 percent of New Zealanders having visited a GP in the 
last year. Nominal fees paid for these visits increased, with nine percent paying nothing for 
their visit, 19 percent paying $20 or less, 47 percent paying $21-40, and 25 percent paying 
more than $40. Given that there was a general increase in prices (inflation) between 1996/97 
and 2002/03, it is not clear whether or not this represents an increase in fees in real terms.
7 
This will be examined more closely later in this section. 
Table 1 also shows differences in utilisation and fees across age groups. We find 
that primary health care utilisation increases considerably with age. In 1996/97, 76 percent of 
15-44 year olds visited a GP in the previous 12 months, compared to 80 percent of 45-64 
year olds and 93 percent of individuals aged 65 years and over. In 2002/03, the pattern was 
the same with 76 percent of 15-44 year-olds visiting a GP in the last year, compared with 83 
percent of 45-64 year olds and 94 percent of individuals aged 65 years and over. Fees paid 
also vary by age, with cheaper visits (less than $10 or free) being less common for older 
individuals. For example, in 1996/97, 40 percent of 15-24 year-olds, 27 percent of 25-44 year 
olds, 17 percent of 45-79 year-olds, and 13 percent of 80+ year-olds paid less than $10 for 
their last visit (including those whose visit was free). The pattern is the same in 2002/03 
although the gradient was less steep with only 26 percent of 15-24 year-olds paying less than 
$10 (or nothing) for their last visit. Visits that cost $11-30 were more common for older 
New Zealanders, while visits that cost over $30 were most common for 25-64 year-olds. 
                                                           
5 Individuals are asked to fill in the arrangement when responding, ‘other arrangements’. This has 
been coded in our data for the 1996/97 survey. The most common responses are ‘paid by ACC’, ‘paid 
by insurance’ or ‘paid by my employer’. We include these individuals in the ‘free’ category in all tables. 
Less than one percent of respondents in each survey report ‘other arrangements’. 
6 All individuals are placed into one of the following groups according to their age at the interview: 15-
24, 25-44, 45-64, 65-79 and 80+. These groups correspond to the groups used to determine age-
specific health policies by the central government, except we group 15-17 year-olds with 18-24 year-
olds because of the sample size and separate 80+ year-olds from 65-79 year-olds because of their 
different health needs.  
7 The general price level, as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased 11 percent 
between the second quarter of 1996 and the second quarter of 2002.  
8 Table 2 examines primary health care utilisation and fees paid for these visits by 
age-group and gender, pooling data from both surveys. In this table, we can see that women 
are more likely to visit the GP than men for all age-groups except the oldest. Overall 85 
percent of women had seen a GP in the last year compared to 75 percent of men. These 
differences are larger in the younger age-groups. Eighty-six percent of 15-24 year-old women 
had visited a GP in the last year compared with 68 percent of 15-24 year-old men, while 94 
percent of 65-79 year-old women visited a GP compared to 92 percent of 65-79 year old 
men. On the other hand, the distribution of fees paid is quite similar for both men and 
women in each age-group.  
Table 3 stratifies these results by age-group and ethnicity.
8 We combine the two 
oldest age-groups for this table because of the small numbers of people in the 80+ age-group 
when the data are analysed by ethnicity. The table shows that primary health care utilisation 
varied a great deal by ethnicity. For example, 82 percent of Pākehā/Europeans visited a GP 
in the last 12 months compared to 78 percent of Pacific Islanders, 75 percent of Māori, and 
only 60 percent of Asians. Looking at the experiences of people in different age groups, we 
find that these differences are particularly large for young people, with 83 percent of 15-24 
year-old Pākehā/Europeans visiting a GP compared to 74 percent of Pacific Islanders, 71 
percent of Māori, and only 48 percent of Asians in this age-group. On the other hand, less 
ethnic variation in utilisation is found among individuals aged 65 or more, with 94 percent of 
Pākehā/Europeans visiting a GP compared to 93 percent of Pacific Islanders and Asians.  
In terms of fees paid, on average, Pākehā/Europeans and Asians paid more for 
GP visits than Māori and Pacific Islanders across all age-groups. For example, 17 percent of 
Pākehā/Europeans and 18 percent of Asians paid $10 or less (or the visit was free). 
Meanwhile 33 percent of Māori and 40 percent of Pacific Islanders paid $10 or less (or the 
visit was free). At the other end of the scale, 15 percent of Pākehā/Europeans and 20 
percent of Asians paid more than $40 for their visit, while eight percent of Māori and five 
percent of Pacific Islanders paid more than $40. 
Table 4 examines primary health care utilisation and fees paid for these visits by 
local New Zealand Deprivation (NZDep) quintile in each survey. NZDep is a small area 
deprivation index that ranks New Zealand areas by deprivation level. NZDep1996 is used 
                                                           
8 Ethnicity is self-defined in the NZHSs, and individuals can choose more than one ethnicity. 
Individuals are assigned to one category using the Statistics New Zealand prioritisation scheme, which 
works as follows: any individual who answers Māori in any choice is Māori, any individual who 
answers Pacific Islander in any choice but not Māori is a Pacific Islander, any individual who answers 
Asian in any choice but not Māori or Pacific Islander is Asian, any individual who answers Other in 
any choice but not Māori, Pacific Islander, or Asian is Other, and all remaining individuals are 
Pākehā/European. 
9 for the 1996/97 data and NZDep2001 is used for the 2002/03 data. The values for the 
indices are summarised from variables taken from the 1996 and 2001 New Zealand Census’ 
respectively. Variables that are included in the summary are the proportion of the population 
who receive a means tested government benefit, have a low income, are unemployed, do not 
have telephone access, do not have access to a car, are within single parent families, have no 
qualifications, crowded living space, and lack of home ownership.
9 Quintile 1 represents the 
20 percent of areas in New Zealand with the least deprived NZDep scores and quintile 5 
represents the 20 percent of areas with the most deprived NZDep scores. Although there is 
a substantial degree of clustering, not all people with high degrees of deprivation live in areas 
with high deprivation scores and vice-versa.  
The likelihood of visiting a GP did not appear to vary by NZDep score in either 
survey year. However, there was a large variation in the fees paid for GP visits for individuals 
living in different communities. In both survey years, individuals living in communities with 
more deprived NZDep scores paid less, on average, for visits than those living in 
communities with less deprived NZDep scores. These differences are substantial, for 
example, in 1996/97, 46 percent of individuals living in quintile 1 paid more than $30 for 
their last GP visit, while only 14 percent of individuals living quintile 5 paid this amount in 
1996/97. In 2002/03, 69 percent of individuals living in quintile 1 paid more than $30 for 
their last GP visit, while only 26 percent of individuals living in quintile 5 paid this amount. 
Table 5 examines the average real fee paid (i.e. inflation adjusted) by individuals 
with different demographic and community characteristics in each survey year. Standard 
errors for each cell are also presented to allow the reader to identify whether a particular 
difference is likely to be statistically significant. We create a continuous measure of nominal 
fees by assigning the approximate mid-point of each bracketed fee range to each observation. 
For example, individuals reporting the cost of their last GP visit as between $11-20 are 
assumed to have paid $15. The top category of more than $40 in the 1996/97 survey and 
more than $50 in the 2002/03 survey are assumed to have paid $45 and $55, respectively. 
These values are then converted to real 2003 dollars using the CPI for the appropriate year.  
As hinted at in the previous tables, average real fees varied a good deal across 
demographic groups, except by gender. For example, individuals aged 15-24 paid the lowest 
fees, on average $9-$10 less than 45-64 year-olds who paid the highest fees, followed by 80+ 
year-olds ($6-$7 less), 65-79 year-olds ($5 less), and 25-44 year-olds ($2-$3 less). Differences 
are also found across ethnic groups, with, on average, Māori paying $5-$7 less and Pacific 
                                                           
9 The weighting given to each of these variables differs slightly between the two indices with a lower 
weighting being placed on access to a telephone in NZDep2001 than in NZDep1996. 
10 Islanders $8-$11 less in GP fees than Pākehā/Europeans, and Asians paying similar fees as 
Pākehā/Europeans. There were also large variations in the fees paid across communities, 
with individuals in the most deprived communities paying, on average, $10-$12 less in GP 
fees than individuals in the least deprived communities.  
Table 5 also shows that, controlling for inflation, GP fees have increased 
significantly over time for all groups, except Asians.
10 Between 1996/97 and 2002/03, fees 
increased by $5-$6 for each age-group, by $7 for Pākehā/Europeans, $4 for Pacific Islanders, 
$3 for Māori, $6-$8 for NZDep quintiles 1-4, and $4 for NZDep quintiles 5 (the most 
deprived population group). Overall, on average, fees increased in real terms by $5.80 
between the two surveys, an increase of 26 percent. 
5 Regression  Analysis 
We next use regression analysis to examine the factors that are associated with 
paying different fees for GP visits in a multivariate framework. This allows us to determine 
which characteristics have the strongest association with GP fees and to establish whether 
there is a statistically significant relationship between each characteristic and the level of GP 
fees paid. The fee paid by an individual for a GP visit reflects both the underlying cost of 
those services and the quality of services purchased. Thus, while the fee is partially 
determined by the local supply of and demand for GPs, as well as local and central 
government price setting policies, ultimately it is a choice variable of the individual.  
As a result, if the regression analysis shows that a particular characteristic is 
associated with paying higher GP fees (for example, gender), we cannot determine whether 
this occurs because women seek out higher cost GP services (e.g. higher quality services), 
there is a limited supply of local doctors specialising in GP services targeted towards women, 
women are charged higher prices because they have a greater demand for GP services, or 
because government policy is influencing fees along this dimension.
11
Each regression model we estimate takes the form: 
it it it it t it Fee X Z C α βδγα =+ + + ++ ε





10 Although fees stayed the same across time for Asians, this result is treated with caution owing to the 
large standard error in the 1996/97 estimate. 
11 In this example, it would be unlikely that government policy affects GP fees paid since these 
policies are not gender specific. However, government policy has targeted price reductions for 
11 where i indexes individuals, t indexes time, Feeit is the real fee paid by individual i for their last 
GP visit in year t,  Xit is a vector of individual i’s  characteristics,  Zit is a vector of 
characteristics for individual i’s household, Cit is a vector of characteristics for individual i’s 
community, α is the overall model intercept, αt is an indicator variable for the survey year of 
each record, which controls for aggregate changes in GP fees over time, and εit is a normal 
white noise error-term. We estimate these models using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) after 
converting the fee paid for each individual’s last GP visit to a continuous variable by 
assigning the approximate mid-point of each bracketed fee range to each observation.
12  
We estimate regression model (1) using data from all respondents who visited a 
GP in the last 12 months and reported the cost of their last GP visit. We ignore any sample 
selection issues and assume that the fees paid by these individuals (80 percent of the sample) 
are representative of the fees that would have been paid by those who did not visit a GP in 
the last year (if they had done so). That is, we assume that the fees paid by individuals 
depend on their observed characteristics and not on unobserved characteristics that are 
correlated with the likelihood of an individual visiting the GP.
13
We estimate five specifications of regression model (1) on the pooled data from 
both surveys. The first specification, which we refer to as the ‘baseline’ model, only controls 
for individual demographics, community characteristics, and the survey year.
14 The second 
specification adds control variables for household composition to the first specification.
15 
The third specification adds control variables for real household income to the second 
specification.
16 The fourth specification adds control variables for employment status and 
                                                           
different age, ethnic and socioeconomic groups and the impact of these policies are likely reflected in 
our regression findings.  
12 We also estimated our regression models using Maximum Likelihood Interval Regression, which is a 
technique designed for models where the dependent variable is reported in brackets. Our results were 
qualitatively similar and thus we present results from the more commonly used OLS approach. 
13 For example, if individuals who did not visit the GP are all predisposed to choosing GPs with low 
fees this could bias our estimates. Intuition suggests that this type of selection is unlikely to be a 
serious concern.  
14 Specifically, we include an indicator variable for whether the respondent is female; four indicator 
variables for their age-group, with being aged 25-44 the omitted default group; three indicator 
variables for the prioritised ethnic groups, with being Pākehā/European or Other the omitted default 
group; three indicator variables for an individual’s highest qualification, with the omitted default group 
being having no qualifications; an indicator variable for whether the individual reports currently being 
legally married or living in a de-facto marriage; an indicator variable for whether the community is 
rural; and a series of indicator variables for each NZDep decile, with decile 1 (e.g. the least deprived 
communities) the omitted default group. 
15 Specifically, we include two indicator variables for whether the household is a ‘single parent 
household’ or a ‘couple with children household’ versus the default omitted group of ‘households with 
no children’. We also control for the number of people living in the household (top-coded at 8). 
16 Approximately 20 percent of households do not report their income in both survey rounds. Given 
their numbers, we do not exclude these households and instead include an indicator variable for 
whether the household has not reported their income. 
12 occupation to the third specification.
17 Finally, the fifth specification adds controls for access 
to health insurance, self-reported health status, chronic health conditions and health 
behaviours.
18
We take this approach of estimating increasingly comprehensive specifications 
for two reasons. First, it allows us to examine whether particular variables explain some of 
the variation we see in the simple descriptive tables. For example, we are able to identify the 
particular variables that explain much of the variation observed in fees paid by different age-
groups. Second, one important concern is that some of our explanatory variables may be 
endogenously determined with GP fees. This is particularly relevant for the health variables 
included in the final specification. For example, the likelihood of reporting health problems 
will depend on how frequently an individual sees a GP which is directly related to the fees 
charged for those services. Another example is that the decision to get individual health 
insurance is quite likely closely related to the fees charged by GPs. Economic variables such 
as employment can also be endogenously determined if, for example, lower available GP fees 
encourage people to go to the doctor more frequently and these time costs lead them to 
reduce their employment intensity. We can alleviate these concerns by examining whether 
the coefficients on socio-demographic characteristics change when we add subsequent 
variables to the model. If they do not change, then it is unlikely that endogeneity bias is a 
serious concern. 
6 Results 
Table 6 presents the results from estimating the five specifications of regression 
model (1). In the baseline specification, we find that, controlling for demographics, younger 
and older people pay less for GP visits. Compared to 25-44 year olds, on average, 45-65 year 
olds pay $2.10 more per visit, while 65-79 year-olds pay $2.40 less per visit, 80+ year olds pay 
$3.20 less per visit and 15-24 year-olds pay $5.30 less per visit. On average, women pay the 
same GP fees as men. Māori pay $3.40 less and Pacific Islanders $5.50 less per visit on 
average than other ethnic groups. People with higher qualifications pay more for GP visits 
                                                           
17 We include two indicator variables for whether an individual is employed full-time or employed 
part-time, with the default omitted group being individuals who are not employed; and eight indicator 
variables for the individual’s occupation, with the default omitted group being individuals who are 
legislators or managers. 
18 We include an indicator variable for whether an individual report being covered by a health or 
medical insurance scheme; four indicator variables for an individual reports their health status as being 
‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘fair’ or ‘poor’, with the default omitted group those who report it being 
‘excellent’; three indicator variables for whether an individual reports ever having been told by a 
doctor that they have asthma, diabetes, or high blood pressure; an indicator variable for whether an 
individual is currently a regular smoker; and an indicator variable for whether an individual had a drink 
containing alcohol in the last 12 months. 
13 (for example, individuals with university qualification pay, on average, $3.90 more per visit 
than individuals with no qualification). Married individuals pay, on average, $2.11 more than 
non-married individuals for GP visits. Individuals living in rural areas pay $3.60 less per visit, 
than those who live in urban areas.  
There is a large price gradient across communities, with individuals living in areas 
with the most deprived NZDep scores paying $10.31 less, on average, for a GP visit than 
those in areas with the least deprived NZDep scores. This occurs at all points in the NZDep 
scale, with even the average individual in a decile 3 community paying significantly less 
($2.01) to visit a GP than the average individual in a decile 1 community. We also find that 
GP prices have increased by $5.70-$6.00 in 2002/03 compared with 1996/97, even after 
controlling for general price increases across the economy.  
Turning to the second specification, we find that adding controls for household 
composition has little qualitative effect on the baseline findings, but that individuals in larger 
households pay less for GP visits ($0.60 less for each household member) and that 
individuals in single parent families pay, on average, $3.60 less for GP visits. Adding real 
household income in the third specification leads to a reduction in the gradient on 
qualifications (for example, now individuals with university qualification are found to pay, on 
average, $2.10 more per visit than individuals with no qualification compared with the $3.90 
difference found with the baseline analysis) and a reduction in the gradient on NZDep, with 
individuals living in areas with the most deprived NZDep scores now found to be paying 
$7.90 less, on average, for a GP visit than those in areas with the least deprived NZDep 
scores.
19 Household income itself is positively related to GP fees, but this is a weak 
relationship, with a $10,000 increase in household income associated with a $0.70 increase in 
fees. However, households that do not report their income pay, on average, $3.40 more for a 
GP visit, leading one to suspect that these are wealthier households. Thus, these results 
indicate that some of the relationship between qualifications, community characteristics and 
GP fees occurs because individuals in higher income households both pay more for GP 
visits, are more likely to have higher qualifications and are more likely to live in less deprived 
communities. However, differences in household income explain only about a third of the 
variation in fees for these characteristics.  
Examining the fourth specification, we find that adding controls for employment 
status has a large impact on a number of results. First, women are now found to spend $1.10 
more on average than men for GP visits. Second, much of the age gradient in fees 
                                                           
19 The difference in fees paid for married individuals in also reduced to $1.10 from $2.10 in the 
baseline specification and Asians are now found to spend more than Pākehā/Europeans on fees. 
14 disappears, with only 15-24 year-olds paying less than 25-44 year-olds for visits ($4.70) and 
both 45-64 year-olds and 65-79 year-olds paying $1.20-$1.70 more per visit. Third, Asians 
now pay $2.35 more than Pākehā/Europeans per visit. Fourth, most of the qualification 
gradient in fees disappears, with individuals with school and vocational qualifications paying 
$0.90-$1.20 more per GP visit than those with no qualifications, but no significant difference 
found for individuals with university qualifications. Interestingly, adding the employment 
controls has little impact on the NZDep-fees gradient.  
The coefficients on the employment variables indicate that people in 
employment pay substantially more for GP visits than those who are not employed (those in 
full-time employment pay $8.60 more and those in part-time employment pay $5.20 more 
than those who are not employed) and that individuals in lower skilled occupations pay less 
for GP visits than individuals in higher skilled occupations. These results are consistent with 
individual income being more important than household income in determining the price 
paid for GP services, with individuals with less available time paying more to visit the GP, 
and with non-employed individuals potentially paying lower fees because of government 
sponsored fee-reductions (for example, having a community service card). Overall, 
employment status and community deprivation have the largest impact on the variation in 
fees paid by individuals once we control for other socioeconomic variables.  
Turning to the final specification, adding the health variables to the model has a 
limited impact on all the other coefficients.
20 This suggests that endogeneity bias caused by 
the inclusion of these variables is not a serious concern. Individuals with health insurance 
pay, on average, $3.20 more per GP visit than other individuals; perhaps indicating that these 
individuals choose higher priced care, or are charged a higher price, because the cost is 
shared with an insurance agency. There is no independent relationship between self-reported 
health status and the cost of a GP visit. Among individuals with chronic health conditions, 
only individuals with diabetes pay significantly different GP fees (they pay $1.80 less, on 
average). Interestingly, regular smokers pay less for GP visits ($0.75 less on average) whereas 
those who have had an alcoholic drink in the last 12 months pay more ($1.60 more on 
average).  
Table 7 presents the results from estimating the last specification in the prior 
table separately by age-group and survey year.
21 This allows us to examine if the relationships 
                                                           
20 The larger effect is on the NZDep-fees gradient, which becomes slightly less pronounced but is still 
large with individuals in decile 10 communities paying, on average, $6.30 more per GP visit than 
individuals in decile 1 communities. 
21 We estimate separate models for each age-group and survey year, except because of small sample 
sizes we pool the 65-79 year-old and 80+ age-groups. 
15 found above are particular to certain age-groups and whether they have changed over time. 
Although we find that 45-64 year-old women paid higher GP fees in 2002/03, no other 
gender differences are found. Māori and Pacific Islanders in all but the 15-25 year-olds age-
group paid significantly lower GP fees in 2002/03 than equivalent Pākehā/Europeans, but 
this was not the case in 1996/97. Asians in the 25-44 and 45-64 year-old age-groups in 
1996/97 and those in the 15-24 year-old age-group in 2002/03, pay substantially higher GP 
fees ($5.70-$9.10 depending on the age-group/year) than equivalent Pākehā/Europeans. 
Employment status was found to matter more in 1996/97 (but was still 
important in 2002/03) for all age-groups. For example, in 1996/97 the full-time employed 
aged less than 65 paid $8.30-$10.60 more than the non-employed, on average, for a GP visit, 
while, in 2002/03, this difference was $3.40-$8.90. Household income has a stronger positive 
relationship with GP fees for older individuals in both surveys (for example, a $10,000 
increase in household income is associated with a $0.30-$1.00 increase in GP fees for 25-44 
year-olds, but a $1.30-$1.60 increase for 65+ year-olds).  
We also find that the relationship between community NZDep and individual 
GP fees varies significantly between age-groups and over-time. We found that for 15-24 year 
olds, fees are not related to NZDep in either survey year. In 1996/97, the difference in fees 
paid by individuals in the least deprived and those in the most deprived communities is 
largest for 24-44 year-olds, with individuals in this age-group in decile 10 areas paying $7.50 
more, on average, than those in decile 1 areas, while for individuals aged 45+, those in decile 
10 areas paid $4.90-5.60 more than those in decile 1 areas. This pattern was reversed in 
2002/03, with individuals aged 45+ in decile 10 areas paying $8.50-$9.30 more, on average, 
than those in decile 1 areas, while individuals aged 24-44 year-olds in decile 10 areas paid 
$7.20 more than those in decile 1 areas. The difference in fees paid by individuals in the least 
deprived and those in the most deprived communities was greater in 2002/03 than in 
1996/97.  
Finally, comparing the model constants for each age-group over time allows us to 
examine how average fees have changed for the different age groups. This exercise shows 
that, on average, real fees increased by $6.00 for 15-24 year-olds, $2.00 for 25-44 year-olds, 
$3.60 for 45-64 year-olds, and by $7.10 for 65+ year-olds between the two survey years, 
holding all other characteristics constant. 
7 Discussion 
This paper reports on the fees paid by New Zealanders visiting GPs in 1996/97 
and 2002/03. They pre-date the introduction of New Zealand’s Primary Health Care Strategy 
16 (PHCS), which began to be implemented from mid-2002 onwards, just as the 2002/03 New 
Zealand Health Survey was beginning to be undertaken. Given the slow take-up of new 
funding during 2002/03, the results here can be considered to provide baseline information 
about fees in New Zealand, prior to the full implementation of the PHCS and the roll-out of 
new funding. 
A number of studies have been undertaken in other countries to explore the 
impact of user fees on primary health care utilisation. Cost sharing has been shown to 
discourage the use of appropriate and inappropriate care roughly equally (Lohr et al., 1986; 
Gruber, 2006), especially for primary and preventive services as opposed to more costly 
hospital services, and particularly amongst those on lower incomes (Rice and Morrison, 
1994). Although the impact of lower charges on health status is less clear, there are 
indications that reduced charges can benefit health status by encouraging visits for 
preventive checks, for example, for high blood pressure, prevention of communicable 
diseases, and other disease screening, again especially for those on low incomes and those 
with poor health (Rice and Morrison, 1994).  
These analyses show that in 1996/97 and 2002/03 fees varied across different 
population groups, even after controlling for a wide range of personal and household 
demographic, economic and health characteristics. We find that fees are lower on average for 
those who are likely to have lower incomes and/or an increased risk of health problems. 
These include those who are not employed, younger and older people, Pacific and Māori 
populations, those in single parent households, those in rural areas, those in larger 
households, and those in more deprived socio-economic areas. We also find lower fees on 
average for those who do not have health insurance, which may in part reflect higher prices 
paid for or charged for those with insurance. These results suggest that the mixed public-
private financing model does allow for variations in the fees that people pay, and – after 
controlling for a range of factors – is in line with our expectation that those with lower 
incomes and those with higher health needs will pay less. As was stated earlier in this paper, 
the fees paid for a GP visit reflect both the underlying cost of those services and the quality 
of services purchased and it is not possible with this dataset to determine the mechanism 
through which lower fees are achieved. 
Prior to the PHCS, most adult New Zealanders were paying the full cost of GP 
care themselves. Those eligible for a subsidy were people on low incomes and people who 
visited the doctor frequently. These people could access the subsidy by applying for a card to 
present to their GP. Concerns have been expressed that the cost of GPs in New Zealand 
resulted in significant barriers to access for many New Zealanders. In a study of five 
17 countries in 2004, 28 percent of New Zealanders reported that they had previously forgone 
medical care because of the cost of a GP visit. This was comparable to the figures for the 
United States but much higher than that for Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia 
(Schoen et al, 2004). This figure is much higher than the six percent of respondents in the 
2002/03 survey who reported that they did not go to the doctor when needed to because of 
cost. The New Zealand Health Survey had a sample size over ten times that of the New 
Zealand component of the Commonwealth International Health Policy Survey and was 
implemented through face-to-face interviews rather than by telephone. These differences in 
survey design may explain the difference in the magnitude of this figure. 
In unreported results, we found that those who reported that they did not see a 
GP when needing to because of the cost, were those who we would expect to have greater 
difficulty paying – households with lower incomes, people without health insurance, people 
in poor health status, and those who live in urban areas. In addition, females, people aged 
under 44, Māori, and Pacific populations were more likely to report that they did not see a 
GP because of the cost. Although subsidies were targeted to those whose healthcare was 
most likely to be adversely affected by co-payments there are several possible explanations as 
to why these measures may not have been sufficient. Firstly, as we have shown in this paper, 
GP fees were rising by more than the rate of inflation (between 1996/97 and 2002/03, real 
fees rose by $5.70-$6), while the government subsidy remained the same (although income 
thresholds for eligibility to subsidies were inflation-adjusted). Second, there was not a full 
take-up of these subsidy cards. In 1996, about 80 percent of those eligible had a Community 
Services Card (CSC) and possibly as few as 20 percent of those eligible had a High Use 
Health Card (HUHC) (Foley, unpublished). Third, it is possible that even after the subsidy, 
GP fees were still high enough to present a barrier to access.  
Given that subsidies were available for those on low incomes and those with high 
health needs, we would have expected to see these lower fees reflected in our results. This 
was not immediately obvious. A $10,000 increase in income led to a $0.40 increase in fees, 
and diabetes was the only chronic health problem where there were significantly different 
fees ($1.80 less on average). A closer look, however, at the results shows some differences in 
fees. Although there was not a strong relationship between household income and GP fees, 
there was a strong relationship between employment and fees paid. On average, those in full-
time employment paid $8.60 more, and those in part-time employment $5.20 more, for GP 
fees, compared with those not in employment. Those who are not in employment are most 
likely to have a low income and therefore be entitled to a CSC. For example, all beneficiaries 
of government financial assistance programmes and superannuates who rely entirely on 
superannuation for financial support were entitled to the CSC. 
18 It is more difficult to observe those with a HUHC within this data than those 
who might have a CSC. The finding that those in poor health, those with asthma, and those 
with high blood pressure paid the same amount as those without these conditions, may 
indicate that most of these individuals did not have access to the government subsidy or that 
the subsidy was not regarded as sufficient payment for providing care to those with chronic 
conditions. 
A number of studies have been undertaken in other countries to explore the 
impact of user fees on primary health care utilisation. Cost sharing has been shown to 
discourage the use of appropriate and inappropriate care roughly equally (Lohr et al., 1986; 
Gruber, 2006), especially for primary and preventive services as opposed to more costly 
hospital services, and particularly amongst those on lower incomes (Rice and Morrison, 
1994). Although the impact of lower charges on health status is less clear, there are 
indications that reduced charges can benefit health status by encouraging visits for 
preventive checks, for example, for high blood pressure, prevention of communicable 
diseases, and other disease screening, again especially for those on low incomes and those 
with poor health (Rice and Morrison, 1994).  
The PHCS aims to resolve some of these issues by providing a more universal 
health subsidy for GP visits. As it is difficult to effectively target low income and high health 
need patients, universal subsidies can improve services for these individuals. As a result of 
these changes we would expect to see less fee variation in general, although it is likely that 
differences will remain, particularly in locations where GP costs are higher (eg. central city 
location, flexible opening hours, higher quality service). There are concerns, however, that 
although GP fees will be lower, the co-payments may still be high enough to remain a barrier 
to access for some individuals (Hefford et al, 2005). Furthermore it is important to recognise 
that fees are not the only barrier of access to GP services. 
In terms of changes over time, utilisation changed very little between 1996/97 
and 2002/03 (79 percent visited a GP in 1996/97 compared to 81 percent in 2002/03). This 
is in spite of increases in both nominal and inflation-adjusted fees over the two survey 
periods, with fewer adults receiving free visits in 2002/03 than in 1996/97 and more adults 
having to pay higher costs in 2002/03 than in 1996/97. This may suggest that demand for 
primary health care services is fairly inelastic, an issue we will return to in future analyses. 
8 Conclusion 
This paper uses representative national survey data to examine the distribution of 
fees paid for primary health care by different individuals under the mixed public-private 
19 financing model in place prior to the introduction of New Zealand’s Primary Health Care 
Strategy. We found that employment status, age, ethnicity, income and insurance status all 
had a significant relationship with the fees paid for GP visits. No direct link between fees 
and health status (other than diabetes where there is a lower than average fee) was found, 
even after controlling for differences in health needs. Thus, a mixed funding model may 
result in some desirable differences in fees charged, but in the New Zealand case, some key 
characteristics (in particular, health status) seemed to play no role in determining the fees 
patients paid when they used primary health care services.  
New Zealand’s PHCS, which began to be implemented in 2002, aims to provide 
more universal subsidies for primary health care. All New Zealanders are now eligible for 
subsidies for primary health care services, and fees have fallen over time as a result of the 
Strategy (Cumming and Gribben, 2007; Mays and Cumming, 2007). Our future research will 
explore how patterns of fees charged to patients have changed as a result of the PHCS, and 
how access to services has also changed as a result of the PHCS. A particular focus will be to 
identify which groups have benefited most from the move from a targeted to a universal 
funding model. 
 
20 9 References 
Anderson GF, Hussey PS, Frogner BK, Waters HR. Health spending in the United States and the 
rest of the industrialized world. Health Affairs 2005;24(4): 903-914. 
Ayanian JZ, Weissman JS, Schneider IC, Ginsburg JA, Zaslavsky AM. Unmet health needs of 
uninsured adults in the United States. The Journal of the American Medical 
Association 2000;284(16): 2061-2069. 
Barer ML, Evans RG, Labelle RJ. Fee controls as cost control: Tales from the frozen north. The 
Milbank Quarterly 1988;66(1): 1-64. 
Beck RG. The effects of co-payment on the poor. The Journal of Human Resources 1978;9(1): 
129-142. 
Crengle S. Māori primary care services: Discussion papers on primary health care. Wellington: 
National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability, 1999. 
Cumming J, Mays N. Shifting to capitation in primary care: What might the impact be in New 
Zealand? Australian Health Review 1999;22(4): 8-24. 
Cumming J, Gribben B. Evaluation of the Primary Health Care Strategy: Practice Data Analysis 
2001-2005. Wellington: Health Services Research Centre, 2007. 
Davis P, Gribben B, Lee RL, McAvoy B. The impact of the new subsidy regime in general 
practise in New Zealand. Health Policy 1994; 29(1,2): 113-125. 
Dixon A, Le Grand J, Henderson J, Murray R, Poteliakhoff E. Is the NHS equitable? A review of 
the evidence. LSE Health and Social Care Discussion Paper Number 11. London: LSE 
Health and Social Care, London School of Economics, 2003. 
Dunlop S, Coyte P, McIsaac W. Socio-economic status and the utilisation of physicians’ services: 
Results from the Canadian National Population Health Survey. Social Science and 
Medicine 2000;51: 123-133. 
Eyles J, Birch S, Newbold KB. Delivering the goods? Access to family physician services in 
Canada: A comparison of 1985 and 1991. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 
1995; 36(4): 322-332. 
Foley J. Community services card review. Wellington: Ministry of Health. Available at 
www.moh.govt.nz (last accessed 13 October 2008). 
Government White Paper. A health service for New Zealand. Wellington: AR Shearer, 
Government Printer, 1974. 
Gribben B. The community services card and utilisation of general practitioner services. New 
Zealand Medical Journal 1996;109: 103-105. 
Gruber J. The role of consumer co-payments for health care: Lessons from the RAND Health 
Insurance Experiment and beyond. United States: The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2006. 
Hadley J, Reschovsky JD. Medicare fees and physicians’ medicare service volume: Beneficiaries 
treated and services per beneficiary. International Journal of Health Care Finance and 
Economics 2006;6: 131–150. 
Hefford M, Crampton P, Foley J. Reducing health disparities through primary care reform: The 
New Zealand experiment. Health Policy 2005;72: 9-23. 
21 Hodgson P. Primary health - low fees are good but what next? Address to Dunedin School of 
Medicine, 2006. 
Hodgson P. Media Release: More support for free doc's visits for under-6s, 2007. 
Hopkins S, Speed N. The decline in ‘free’ general practitioner care in Australia: Reasons and 
repercussions. Health Policy 2005;73(3): 316-329  
Jones G, Savage E, Van Gool K. The Distribution of Household Health Expenditures in Australia. 
The Economic Record 2008; 84: S99–S114 
Lairson DR, Hindson P, Hauquitzc A. Equity of health care in Australia. Social Science & 
Medicine 1995;41(4): 475-482.  
Lohr KN, Brook RH, Kamberg CJ, Goldberg GA, Leibowitz A, Keesey J, Reboussin D, 
Newhouse JP. Use of medical care in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment: 
Diagnosis- and service-specific analyses in a randomized controlled trial. Medical 
Care 1986;24(Supplement): S1-87. 
Mays N, Cumming C. Performance of New Zealand’s publicly financed health care system: A 
focus on performance under the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 
(2000). Report Number 10, Health Reforms 2001 Research Project. Wellington: 
Health Services Research Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, 2007  
Ministry of Health. Taking the pulse: the 1996/97 New Zealand health survey. Wellington: 
Ministry of Health, 1999. 
Ministry of Health. New Zealand health and disability sector overview. Wellington: Ministry of 
Health, 2003. 
Ministry of Health. Care Plus: Frequently Asked Questions. Wellington: Ministry of Health, 2004. 
Newhouse JP. A Model of Physician Pricing. Southern Economic Journal 1970;37(2): 174-183. 
OECD. Health at a Glance 2007. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2007. 
Raymont A. Cost barriers to health care: provisional analysis from the New Zealand Health Survey 
2002/03. Wellington: Ministry of Health, 2004. 
Rice T, Morrison KR. Patient cost sharing for medical services: A review of the literature and 
implications for health care reforms. Medical Care Review 1994;51(3): 235-287. 
Richardson JRJ, Peacock SJ, Mortimer D. Does an increase in the doctor supply reduce medical 
fees? An econometric analysis of medical fees across Australia. Applied Economics 
2006;38(3): 253-266. 
Schoen C, Osborn R, Trang Huynh P, Doty M, Davis K, Zapert K, Peugh J. Primary Care and 
Health System Performance: Adults' Experiences in Five Countries. Health Affairs 
Web Exclusive 2004; W4: 487-503. 
Scitovsky A, Sneider N. Effects of co-insurance on use of physicians services. Social Security 
Bulletin 1972;35(6): 3-19. 
Sepehri A, Chernomas R. Are user charges efficiency- and equity-enhancing? A critical review of 
economic literature with particular reference to experience from developing countries. 
Journal of International Development 2001;13: 183-209. 
22 Steinwald B, Stone FA. Determinants of physicians' fees. The Journal of Business 1974;47(4): 
493-511. 
Tukiotonga C. Primary healthcare for Pacific people in New Zealand. Wellington: National 
Advisory Committee on Health and Disability, 1999. 
Van Doorslaer E, Clarke P, Savage E, Hall, J. Horizontal inequities in Australia’s mixed 
public/private health care system. Health Policy 2008;86(1): 97–108. 
23 Table 1: Primary Healthcare Utilisation and Fees Paid by Age Group and Survey 
Age  Group  15-24 25-44 45-64 65-79  80+ Overall 
1996/97 Survey 
Visited GP in Last Year 78%  75%  80%  93%  95%  79% 
Last Visit Was Free  23%  13%  5%  7%  7%  12% 
 Less Than 10 Dollars  17%  14%  12%  10%  6%  13% 
  11-20  Dollars  29% 20% 24% 47% 60% 28% 
  21-30  Dollars  18% 16% 17% 18% 18% 17% 
 31-40 Dollars  9%  31%  39%  15%  6%  26% 
 More than 40 Dollars  4%  6%  3%  3%  2%  4% 
Number of Individuals  944  3,024  1,931  1,090  280  7,269 
Number Reporting Fees 724 2,249  1,531 986  264 5,754 
2002/03 Survey 
Visited GP in Last Year 76%  76%  83%  94%  96%  81% 
Last Visit Was Free  18%  11%  6%  5%  5%  9% 
  Less  Than  10  Dollars  8% 5% 3% 4% 3% 5% 
  11-20  Dollars  19% 11% 12% 17% 20% 14% 
  21-30  Dollars  20% 17% 18% 42% 47% 22% 
  31-40  Dollars  19% 27% 30% 17% 16% 25% 
 41-50 Dollars  10%  23%  25%  13%  8%  20% 
 More than 50 Dollars  5%  6%  5%  3%  2%  5% 
Number of Individuals  1,452 4,964 3,665 1,674  482 12,237 
Number Reporting Fees 961 3,642  2,991  1,535 452 9,581 
Note: Individuals who paid other arrangements (mostly <1%, in 1996/97 survey, this mostly referred 
to ACC, employer or insurance) are included in the Free category. 
 
24 Table 2: Primary Healthcare Utilisation and Fees Paid by Age Group and Gender 
  Age  Group  15-24 25-44 45-64 65-79  80+  Overall 
Male 
Visited  GP  in  Last  Year  68% 69% 79% 92% 96%  75% 
Last Visit Was Free  19%  10%  6%  7%  6%  10% 
 Less Than 10 Dollars  14%  12%  7%  6%  4%  10% 
  11-20  Dollars  26% 15% 17% 32% 35%  21% 
  21-30  Dollars  18% 16% 19% 27% 35%  19% 
  31-40  Dollars  12% 29% 34% 18% 13%  26% 
 More than 40 Dollars  11%  18%  17%  10%  8%  15% 
Number of Individuals  1,003 2,949 2,407 1,151  265  7,775 
Number Reporting Fees  630  1,915 1,872 1,033  251  5,701 
Female 
Visited  GP  in  Last  Year  86% 81% 84% 94% 95%  85% 
Last Visit Was Free  22%  14%  5%  5%  5%  11% 
  Less  Than  10  Dollars  12%  8% 7% 7% 5%  8% 
  11-20  Dollars  23% 16% 18% 32% 37%  21% 
  21-30  Dollars  19% 16% 17% 33% 36%  20% 
  31-40  Dollars  15% 29% 35% 15% 12%  25% 
 More than 40 Dollars  8%  17%  18%  9%  5%  14% 
Number of Individuals  1,393 5,039 3,189 1,613  497  11,731 
Number Reporting Fees  1,055 3,976 2,650 1,488  465  9,634 
Note: Individuals who paid other arrangements (mostly <1%, in 1996/97 survey, this mostly referred 
to ACC, employer or insurance) are included in the Free category. 
25 Table 3: Primary Healthcare Utilisation and Fees Paid by Age Group and Ethnicity 
 Age Group  15-24  25-44  45-64  65+  Overall 
Pākehā/European 
Visited GP in Last Year  83%  78%  81%  94%  82% 
Last Visit Was Free  20%  11%  5%  5%  9% 
 Less Than 10 Dollars  12%  9%  6%  6%  8% 
 11-20 Dollars  25%  15%  17%  32%  20% 
 21-30 Dollars  21%  15%  17%  32%  20% 
 31-40 Dollars  15%  32%  36%  16%  27% 
 More than 40 Dollars  8%  19%  19%  9%  15% 
Number of Individuals  953  3,990  3,653  2,826  11,422 
Number Reporting Fees 753  3,068  2,971  2,608  9,400 
Māori 
Visited GP in Last Year  71%  72%  82%  89%  75% 
Last Visit Was Free  25%  17%  13%  14%  18% 
 Less Than 10 Dollars  19%  15%  11%  14%  15% 
 11-20 Dollars  22%  21%  27%  41%  24% 
 21-30 Dollars  15%  21%  20%  23%  19% 
 31-40 Dollars  10%  17%  24%  4%  16% 
 More than 40 Dollars  10%  10%  5%  3%  8% 
Number of Individuals  855  2,454  1,353  540  5,202 
Number Reporting Fees 565  1,753  1,068  482  3,868 
Pacific Islander 
Visited GP in Last Year  74%  75%  88%  93%  78% 
Last Visit Was Free  25%  20%  9%  7%  18% 
 Less Than 10 Dollars  23%  19%  26%  22%  22% 
 11-20 Dollars  22%  23%  29%  49%  26% 
 21-30 Dollars  14%  22%  14%  15%  18% 
 31-40 Dollars  9%  14%  13%  3%  12% 
 More than 40 Dollars  7%  2%  10%  4%  5% 
Number of Individuals  282  757  318  98  1,455 
Number Reporting Fees  201  565  273  91  1,130 
Asian 
Visited GP in Last Year  48%  57%  76%  93%  60% 
Last Visit Was Free  23%  10%  7%  3%  12% 
 Less Than 10 Dollars  5%  9%  2%  7%  6% 
 11-20 Dollars  32%  12%  11%  36%  18% 
 21-30 Dollars  6%  21%  22%  20%  18% 
 31-40 Dollars  15%  27%  37%  15%  26% 
 More than 40 Dollars  20%  21%  20%  19%  20% 
Number of Individuals  296  723  249  55  1,323 
Number Reporting Fees  161  458  191  49  859 
Note: Individuals who paid other arrangements (mostly <1%, in 1996/97 survey, this mostly referred 
to ACC, employer or insurance) are included in the Free category. 
26 Table 4: Primary Healthcare Utilisation and Fees Paid by NZDep Quintile and 
Survey 
NZDep  Quintile  1 2 3 4 5  Overall 
1996/97 Survey 
Visited GP in Last Year  81%  77%  79%  80%  78%  79% 
Last Visit Was Free  8%  10%  12%  13%  17%  12% 
 Less Than 10 Dollars  9%  13%  12%  16%  17%  13% 
  11-20  Dollars  20% 24% 30% 30% 36%  28% 
  21-30  Dollars  18% 20% 17% 14% 16%  17% 
  31-40  Dollars  39% 29% 25% 24% 12%  26% 
 More than 40 Dollars  7%  5%  3%  3%  2%  4% 
Number of Individuals  971  1,187 1,313 1,579 2,219  7,269 
Number Reporting Fees 793  938 1,032 1,270 1,721  5,754 
2002/03 Survey 
Visited GP in Last Year  78%  83%  82%  82%  80%  81% 
Last Visit Was Free  8%  8%  8%  10%  13%  9% 
 Less Than 10 Dollars  2%  2%  4%  5%  10%  5% 
 11-20 Dollars  7%  9%  13%  16%  23%  14% 
  21-30  Dollars  15% 21% 23% 25% 27%  22% 
  31-40  Dollars  30% 29% 26% 23% 16%  25% 
 41-50 Dollars  30%  24%  21%  16%  8%  20% 
 More than 50 Dollars  9%  7%  4%  4%  2%  5% 
Number of Individuals  1,674 1,541 1,824 2,346 4,852  12,237 
Number Reporting Fees  1,319 1,260 1,473 1,868 3,661  9,581 
Note: Individuals who paid other arrangements (mostly <1%, in 1996/97 survey, this mostly referred 
to ACC, employer or insurance) are included in the Free category. 
27 Table 5: Real GP Fees Paid by Age Group, Characteristics and Survey 
  1996/1997 Survey  2002/2003 Survey 
  Mean Standard  Error Mean Standard  Error 
Overall  22.47 0.28 28.34 0.22 
Aged  15-24  16.29 0.77 22.41 0.73 
Aged  25-44  23.41 0.47 29.39 0.37 
Aged  45-64  26.25 0.50 31.19 0.36 
Aged  65-79  20.87 0.55 26.44 0.43 
Aged  80+  18.98 0.79 25.03 0.61 
Male  22.46 0.46 28.75 0.34 
Female 22.47  0.36 28.01 0.29 
European/Pākehā 23.25 0.32 29.77 0.25 
Māori  17.85 0.83 21.17 0.60 
Pacific  Islander  14.80 0.75 18.50 0.84 
Asian  26.51 1.76 27.90 0.92 
NZDep Quintile 1  27.41 0.71 33.74 0.50 
NZDep Quintile 2  23.95 0.63 31.60 0.50 
NZDep Quintile 3  22.03 0.63 29.15 0.48 
NZDep Quintile 4  20.66 0.56 26.61 0.46 
NZDep Quintile 5  17.11 0.43 21.34 0.45 
Number Reporting Fees 5,754  9,581 
Note: Real GP fees in 2003 dollars are calculated by converting the bracketed variable to a continuous 
variable by assigning the approximate mid-point of each bracket to each observation and then 
adjusting by the CPI for the appropriate year.  
28 Table 6: OLS Regression of Real GP Fees Paid Pooling Both Surveys 
Specification Baseline  Hse  Comp Hse  Inc  Employment  Health 
Female -0.07  0.18  0.33 1.09**  1.14** 
   (0.34)  (0.35)  (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) 
Aged 15-24   -5.32**  -5.60** -5.45** -4.71** -4.86** 
(default 25-44)  (0.63)  (0.70) (0.71) (0.69) (0.68) 
Aged 45-64  2.09**  1.56** 1.64** 1.86** 1.68** 
 (0.41)  (0.44)  (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) 
Aged 65-79  -2.38**  -3.50** -2.03**  1.18*  1.23* 
 (0.47)  (0.53)  (0.54) (0.58) (0.59) 
Age 80+  -3.19**  -4.50** -3.22**  0.22  0.86 
 (0.59)  (0.63)  (0.63) (0.69) (0.71) 
Prioritised Māori  -3.39** -2.83** -2.62** -2.45** -2.14** 
(default Pr Pākehā)  (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.55) (0.55) 
Prioritised Pacifica  -5.48**  -4.25** -3.91** -3.70** -2.78** 
 (0.63)  (0.69)  (0.68) (0.65) (0.67) 
Prioritised Asian  0.17  0.60 1.46+  2.35**  2.89** 
   (0.87)  (0.88)  (0.87) (0.88) (0.88) 
School Quals  2.10**  2.03** 1.62**  1.17*  0.92 
(default No Quals)  (0.60)  (0.59) (0.59) (0.57) (0.57) 
Vocational Quals  2.32**  2.23** 1.71**  0.90*  0.54 
 (0.38)  (0.38)  (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) 
University Quals  3.91** 3.64** 2.08**  0.74  0.44 
 (0.65)  (0.64)  (0.65) (0.69) (0.69) 
Married 2.11**  1.72** 1.07* 0.86+  0.64 
   (0.37)  (0.46)  (0.47) (0.45) (0.45) 
Single Parent Household    -3.57** -3.09** -2.68** -2.36** 
(default No Children in Hse)    (0.62) (0.62) (0.60) (0.59) 
Couple w/ Children    0.07  0.25  0.17  0.21 
    (0.56) (0.56) (0.55) (0.54) 
# People in Household    -0.62** -0.85** -0.61** -0.56** 
      (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Real Hse Income (thous)      0.07**  0.05**  0.04** 
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Hse Income Unreported      3.43**  2.68**  2.37** 
     (0.54)  (0.54)  (0.54) 
Full-Time Employed      8.57**  7.74** 
       (0.70)  (0.71) 
Part-Time Employed        5.21**  4.43** 
         (0.79)  (0.80) 
Professionals       -2.16**  -1.97* 
(default Legs & Managers)        (0.79)  (0.79) 
Techs and Assoc. Profs        -1.33  -1.07 
       (0.91)  (0.90) 
Clerks       -1.64+  -1.49+ 
       (0.87)  (0.86) 
Service and Sales        -2.61**  -2.28** 
       (0.84)  (0.84) 
Agriculture and Fishery        -4.17**  -3.92** 
       (1.06)  (1.04) 
Trades Workers        -3.23**  -2.70** 
       (1.02)  (0.99) 
Operators & Assemblers        -4.20**  -3.71** 
       (0.99)  (0.98) 
Elementary Occupations        -4.49**  -3.95** 
         (0.98)  (0.99) 
Has  Insurance       3.18** 
       (0.39) 
Health = Vgood          0.12 
(default  =  excellent)       (0.51) 
29 Specification Baseline  Hse  Comp Hse  Inc  Employment  Health 
Health = Good          0.67 
       (0.53) 
Health = Fair          0.31 
       (0.63) 
Health = Poor          0.20 
       (1.09) 
Has  Asthma       0.69 
       (0.44) 
Has  Diabetes       -1.84** 
       (0.67) 
Has High Blood Pressure          0.15 
         (0.40) 
Is a Smoker          -0.76+ 
       (0.40) 
Is  a  Drinker       1.57** 
       (0.41) 
Lives in Rural Area  -3.56**  -3.57** -3.30** -3.06** -2.93** 
  (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.52) (0.51) 
NZDep Decile 2  -1.23  -1.30 -0.49 -0.51 -0.45 
  (0.86) (0.86) (0.85) (0.84) (0.83) 
NZDep Decile 3  -2.01*  -2.07* -0.91  -0.90  -0.64 
  (0.89) (0.89) (0.90) (0.89) (0.86) 
NZDep Decile 4  -3.64**  -3.70** -2.19* -2.22** -1.90* 
  (0.86) (0.87) (0.86) (0.85) (0.83) 
NZDep Decile 5  -3.79**  -3.91** -2.32** -2.37**  -1.91* 
  (0.85) (0.85) (0.84) (0.83) (0.82) 
NZDep Decile 6  -5.15**  -5.18** -3.30** -3.37** -2.86** 
  (0.87) (0.87) (0.86) (0.84) (0.82) 
NZDep Decile 7  -5.55**  -5.69** -3.86** -3.88** -3.17** 
  (0.84) (0.85) (0.84) (0.83) (0.82) 
NZDep Decile 8  -6.86**  -7.03** -5.18** -5.17** -4.52** 
  (0.84) (0.85) (0.84) (0.82) (0.81) 
NZDep Decile 9  -8.37**  -8.41** -6.40** -6.07** -5.25** 
  (0.83) (0.83) (0.81) (0.81) (0.80) 
NZDep Decile 10  -10.31**  -10.17** -7.85**  -7.32**  -6.27** 
    (0.85) (0.86) (0.85) (0.83) (0.82) 
Year = 2002  6.00**  6.10** 6.53** 6.21** 6.21** 
  (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.56) (0.56) 
Year = 2003  5.72**  5.84** 6.33** 5.96** 5.95** 
  (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
Constant 25.64**  28.24** 23.80** 20.60** 18.19** 
    (0.90) (0.95) (0.94) (0.95) (1.07) 
Observations  15335 15335 15335 15335 15335 
R-squared  0.17 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.23 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. Significance: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Fees are specified 
as a continuous variable using the bracket mid-point and five dollars above for the top bracket. 
30 Table 7: OLS Regression of Real GP Fees Paid by Age Group and Survey 
Survey Year  1996/97  2002/03 
Age Group  15-24 25-44 45-64 65+  15-24 25-44  45-64  65+ 
Female 2.01  1.44  0.42  0.49 -1.42 0.59  2.13**  0.77 
   (1.30) (0.99) (0.93) (0.91) (1.44) (0.87) (0.70) (0.73)
Age  80+      -1.13      -0.50 
      (0.95)     (0.70)
Prioritised Māori 1.39  -1.49  0.24  -2.65+ -0.40 -3.57**  -6.08**  -6.10**
(default Pr Pākehā) (2.21) (1.02) (1.34) (1.51) (2.04) (1.01) (1.09) (1.22)
Prioritised Pacifica  -2.15  -1.54  -4.29* 0.09 3.88  -6.72** -4.09* -7.14**
 (2.11) (1.38) (1.96) (2.38) (2.81) (1.44) (1.72) (1.78)
Prioritised Asian  -1.17  5.74** 9.10** 0.12 6.94* -0.49 1.47 5.38 
   (3.56) (1.99) (3.24) (2.51) (2.88) (1.47) (1.52) (3.97)
School Quals    0.80  -2.18  -0.21    2.79* 0.36 2.26* 
(default No Quals)    (1.39) (1.91) (1.80)  (1.34)  (1.19)  (1.07)
Vocational Quals    -0.13  -0.28 1.69+   2.19*  0.80  1.14 
   (1.03) (0.93) (0.88)   (1.03) (0.85) (0.71)
University Quals    -1.10  -1.18  2.56  1.92  0.07  3.05* 
   (1.80) (2.10) (2.82)   (1.40) (1.23) (1.54)
Married 0.61  0.90  0.43  -1.38 -0.49 -1.97 0.85 -0.83 
   (2.33) (1.29) (1.08) (1.16) (2.23) (1.36) (0.94) (0.95)
Full-Time Employed  8.34** 10.15** 10.60** -4.37 8.95** 5.76** 3.42** 3.39+
 (1.68) (1.81) (1.72) (3.33) (1.73) (1.37) (1.19) (2.01)
Part-Time Employed  -2.73  7.00** 7.67** -1.19 2.04 3.77* 2.45+  0.90 
   (1.69) (2.03) (2.05) (2.67) (1.84) (1.54) (1.34) (1.27)
Professionals   -2.11  -5.88**    -2.11  0.61   
(default Legs & Managers)    (2.00) (1.91)     (1.36)  (1.26)   
Techs and Assoc. Profs    -3.15  -3.28+     -0.27  -0.30   
   (2.05) (1.78)    (1.71)  (1.85)  
Clerks   -1.79  -3.58+     -1.33  0.56   
   (1.96) (1.91)    (1.64)  (1.54)  
Service and Sales    -1.49  0.07      -2.22  1.32   
   (1.95) (1.83)    (1.52)  (1.36)  
Agriculture and Fishery    -4.74* -6.11*    -5.45**  1.41   
   (2.24) (2.41)    (1.88)  (1.55)  
Trades  Workers    -6.80** -4.80    -2.10  -0.70  
   (2.36) (3.16)    (1.55)  (1.63)  
Operators & Assemblers    -6.00** -6.36**    -4.54*  0.64   
   (2.14) (2.09)    (1.92)  (1.80)  
Elementary Occupations    -7.16** -6.23*    -1.09  -3.12+   
     (2.65) (2.74)    (1.74)  (1.70)  
Single Parent Household  -1.80 -2.84* -2.87  -2.55  -0.91 -2.04  -2.99+  -4.60*
(default No Children in Hse)  (2.37) (1.39) (1.82) (2.25) (2.25) (1.27) (1.54) (1.86)
Couple w/ Children  -4.82+ 1.38 -2.49+ 2.03  1.60  1.03 -1.62  3.58+
 (2.70) (1.35) (1.47) (3.14) (3.50) (1.30) (1.08) (2.15)
# People in Household  -0.33  -0.66+ -0.09 -0.48  -1.21* -0.40 -0.02 -1.14 
   (0.56) (0.39) (0.59) (0.91) (0.52) (0.31) (0.40) (0.69)
Real Hse Income (thous)  0.02  0.03*  0.04* 0.13** 0.06  0.10** 0.08** 0.16**
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Hse Income Unreported  0.48  2.52+ 3.96** 6.78** 2.40 4.27**  4.34**  5.00**
 (2.31) (1.38) (1.47) (1.77) (2.38) (1.37) (1.18) (1.06)
Has Insurance  3.89* 3.91** 3.78** 1.38 2.78+ 1.73*  2.88**  3.13**
 (1.61) (0.95) (1.12) (1.13) (1.65) (0.77) (0.73) (0.82)
Health = Vgood  -0.48  0.62  -0.26 -0.19 2.62 -1.34 -0.27 0.21 
(default = excellent)  (2.16) (1.19) (1.37) (1.63) (1.96) (1.02) (0.98) (1.14)
Health = Good  -4.04+ 0.48  1.55 0.51 3.37 0.58 1.02 1.19 
 (2.42) (1.25) (1.38) (1.61) (2.08) (1.06) (1.00) (1.17)
31 Survey Year  1996/97  2002/03 
Age Group  15-24  25-44 45-64 65+  15-24 25-44 45-64  65+ 
Health = Fair  -2.90  1.14  0.56 0.61 0.79 1.07 0.72 -0.60 
 (2.60)  (1.63) (1.85) (1.71) (2.66) (1.46) (1.30) (1.31) 
Health = Poor  -0.53  -1.13  -2.70 1.61 0.85 -0.90 0.42 1.06 
 (2.98)  (2.71) (2.84) (2.54) (6.08) (2.32) (1.84) (2.06) 
Has Asthma  2.35  1.30  -0.79 0.86 2.02 0.52 0.68 -0.33 
 (1.95)  (1.06) (1.05) (0.95) (1.53) (0.89) (1.02) (1.10) 
Has Diabetes  9.09*  -1.61  -1.64  -1.16 6.08 -1.51  -4.46**  -0.84 
 (4.28)  (2.06) (1.33) (1.43) (9.72) (2.64) (1.56) (0.98) 
Has High Blood Pressure  -3.46  -3.52+ 0.19 0.45 -1.30 0.46 0.00 1.34* 
   (5.85)  (1.98) (1.11) (0.86) (2.98) (1.03) (0.69) (0.65) 
Is a Smoker  -1.57  -0.72  -2.53* 0.40 0.09 -0.74 -0.71 0.29 
 (1.56)  (0.88) (1.04) (1.33) (1.76) (0.81) (0.84) (1.24) 
Is a Drinker  -0.43  1.59  1.65  0.38 -1.88  2.44*  2.83**  1.62* 
 (1.64)  (1.09) (1.21) (0.94) (2.06) (1.07) (0.92) (0.74) 
Lives in Rural Area  -2.23  -4.22** -3.57** -3.64* -0.89 -1.93+ -5.09** -0.96 
 (2.45)  (1.34) (1.26) (1.70) (2.07) (1.10) (0.92) (1.06) 
NZDep Decile 2  3.72  -3.63+ -0.19 -1.62 4.58  0.03 -0.98 -2.45 
 (3.50)  (1.85) (1.93) (2.61) (3.87) (1.60) (1.35) (1.54) 
NZDep Decile 3  4.12  -4.25* -1.59 -1.28 1.27  1.80 -0.08  -3.35* 
 (4.62)  (2.03) (1.94) (2.07) (3.82) (1.69) (1.48) (1.60) 
NZDep Decile 4  2.76  -5.03** -3.18  -1.84 0.44 -0.76 -1.73  -3.34* 
 (3.33)  (1.88) (2.14) (2.06) (3.72) (1.63) (1.49) (1.57) 
NZDep Decile 5  -0.81  -4.22* -1.41 0.91 1.29 -1.31 -2.26  -5.30** 
 (3.29)  (1.82) (1.90) (2.24) (3.78) (1.76) (1.42) (1.57) 
NZDep Decile 6  -1.08  -6.57** -0.48  -1.75 2.44 -1.60  -3.62*  -6.80** 
 (3.57)  (1.76) (1.90) (2.13) (4.01) (1.70) (1.47) (1.59) 
NZDep Decile 7  1.84  -6.72** -4.48* -4.03* -0.49 -0.02  -3.35*  -6.99** 
 (3.10)  (1.88) (1.98) (2.00) (3.64) (1.63) (1.47) (1.58) 
NZDep Decile 8  -2.24  -6.19** -2.56  -3.88+ -1.63 -5.55** -3.33* -7.74** 
 (3.27)  (1.89) (1.93) (2.00) (3.64) (1.73) (1.43) (1.47) 
NZDep Decile 9  -0.24  -7.52** -2.82  -5.58** -1.68 -5.05** -6.70**  -8.22** 
 (2.94)  (1.72) (1.91) (1.85) (3.75) (1.63) (1.72) (1.52) 
NZDep Decile 10  -1.50  -7.48** -4.90* -5.61** -4.24 -7.17** -8.43**  -9.30** 
   (3.14)  (1.64) (1.92) (1.94) (3.69) (1.83) (1.64) (1.82) 
Year = 2003          -1.26  0.02  0.55  -0.27 
         (2.09) (0.93) (0.92)  (0.77) 
Constant 13.69**  19.90** 19.75** 19.00** 19.68** 21.91** 23.36** 26.07** 
   (3.81)  (2.55) (2.46) (2.65) (5.03) (2.63) (2.20) (2.29) 
Observations 724  2249  1531  1250  961  3642  2991  1987 
R-squared 0.21  0.22  0.24  0.15 0.14 0.19 0.24 0.23 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. Significance: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Fees are specified 
as a continuous variable using the bracket mid-point and five dollars above for the top bracket. 
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